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O
n April 15, 2003, four experts analyzed issues of Russian privatization from different perspectives in a 
roundtable organized by the Center for Transition Economies, Columbia University. Marshall Goldman, 
Associate Director of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, and author of 
The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry, linked the emergence of Russia's oligarchs to the hasty and 
nontransparent privatization of Russia's productive assets. James Millar, Professor of Economics and International 
Affairs at the George Washington University, and author of several books and articles on Soviet economic history 
and the economics of transition, brought out features of the faulty asset distribution that reinforced the old structures 
of the Soviet economy, namely, the nomenklatura and the bureaucracy, and invigorated the growth of crime and 
corruption in its aftermath. Stephen Handelman, a writer for Time magazine on trans-border issues, associate fellow 
at the Harriman Institute, and author of Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, traced the origins of the chaotic 
asset grabbing to the final days of the Soviet regime during which Party bosses exploited their connections to the 
hilt. Padma Desai, Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of Comparative Economic Systems and Director, Center 
for Transition Economies, Columbia University, and author of the forthcoming Conversations on Russia, argued 
that the process of Russian privatization was politically motivated in its goals and economically inequitable in its 
outcomes. The interaction among the four experts and questions from the audience created an intellectually 
invigorating dialogue that is presented below. James Millar chaired the session.
Millar: Since I don't really have to introduce anyone, 
the order of presentations is Marshall Goldman first, 
then Padma Desai, then myself, then Stephen 
Handelman. Try to keep the presentation to fifteen 
minutes. To open, let me say that when I was an 
undergraduate many years ago at the University of 
Texas at Austin, Professor Montgomery, who taught, 
of all things, corporate finance at the university, was a 
well-known socialist, not a Communist, but an 
American-style socialist. During the pre-McCarthy 
days, the Texas legislature, as in several states, had 
hearings where they called up professors and asked 
them: “Are you members of the Communist Party? Do 
you believe in free speech?” Professor Montgomery 
was asked: “Do you believe in private property?” He 
said: “Of course, I do. Because I think it's a wonderful 
thing, and I think everyone should have some of it.” So 
on that positive note in favor of private property, let us 
begin with Marshall.
Goldman: Thanks, Jim. I appreciate Padma arranging 
this panel discussion. My book Piratization of Russia 
came out this weekend. It discusses the emergence of a 
small group of Russians in 1991 at the time of the
collapse of the Soviet Union who claimed ownership of 
some of the world's most valuable petroleum, natural 
gas and metal resources. It resulted in one of the 
greatest transfers of wealth in the world. In 1997, five 
of them were among the Forbes billionaires. Today 
they are 17. Some of them are self-styled oligarchs 
who have been accused of using guile, intimidation and 
occasionally violence to take control of these assets. I 
was curious about why it happened. In fact, how did it 
happen?
Who was responsible? Could it have been done 
differently? I recognize that any transition of this sort, 
after 70 years of Communism, was going to cause 
some inequality and controversy. That said, I wanted to 
analyze the process in depth. As Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
the Russian Prime Minister, put it: “We wanted things 
to turn out for the best; instead they turned out as they 
always do.” My incentive was to see whether the 
process could have been managed differently.
So I will describe the key features of the Russian 
privatization program in the few minutes at my 
disposal. I also want to bring out the new features in 
my book, some features that have not been dealt with 
by analysts like David Hoffman, who has an excellent
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book on Russian privatization. I will end by asking a 
question: Will Russia be able to escape the 
consequences of the past and move in a new direction? 
Will it do away with what has indeed limited its ability 
to develop for everyone's benefit? In brief, what were 
the main features of the privatization process and why 
did the leaders adopt a specific course?
Well, if you listen to Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly 
Chubais, Gaidar being the former Acting Prime 
Minister under Boris Yeltsin, and Chubais his cabinet 
minister in charge of privatization, they feared a return 
to Communism. When the USSR collapsed in 
December 1991, there was a good deal of uncertainty; 
there were terrible shortages. And, in an effort to 
prevent a return to the past, to give everyone a stake in 
the new situation, they decided to form people's 
capitalism. It was driven by the idea that people would 
then have a stake in the old enterprises that were newly 
being privatized. They feared that if they moved 
slowly, the factory directors would strip the assets for 
themselves, there would be rioting in the streets, and 
people would vote to go back to the old system. 
Moreover, the economy was in a desperate shape. 
Foreign exchange reserves were so depleted they were 
inadequate to provide for imports. I was there in 1992, 
and I can tell you the shelves were empty. That was 
really worrisome. In some places, there wasn't even 
enough bread. So they decided to move rapidly in 1992 
by using shock therapy. That meant that they tried to 
free up as much as possible of the economy and 
remove the controls that had been in place before.
Let me now focus on privatization. You must 
understand that Russian industries were gigantic, the 
result of the Soviet-era gigantomania. The bigger the 
scale, the better. It was as if they all came from Texas. 
There were of course advantages arising from 
economies of scale. Henry Ford gave us any color 
Model-T we wanted as long as it was black; that meant 
that it was mass produced at a cheap price. And the 
Soviets copied the idea hook, line and sinker, except 
that the planners were in charge. They also thought that 
if they overproduced, they would outperform the 
United States and the West because they would be able 
to mass produce items in large units at cheap prices. As 
a result, most factories were massive monopolies and 
were state owned and managed. The idea underlying 
privatization was to convert them into private 
monopolies. One of the major criticisms I have is that 
they did not concentrate on the possibility of 
facilitating startups and creating brand new businesses. 
That was a key flaw, particularly if you compare the 
situation to what happened in Poland.
The process created two types of oligarchs. You are 
not going to be able to see this chart, which is an old 
CIA diagram. It is in the book if you want to follow it 
carefully. The first category, which I call the
nomenklatura oligarchs, is represented by Vagit 
Alekperov, former acting head of the petroleum 
ministry. He carved out three oil entities and created 
Lukoil, which, for a time, was Russia's largest oil 
producer. Another example is Rem Vyakhirev, who 
was formerly the deputy minister of the natural gas 
industry under Chernomyrdin, when Chernomyrdin 
was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 1992. 
Vyakhirev moved up, took charge of the gas ministry, 
Gazprom, when it was privatized, and made it his own.
The second set is more interesting. I call its 
members the non-traditional, non-nomenklatura 
oligarchs, and I'll say a little bit more about them. This 
will throw fresh light on the creation of Russia's 
oligarchs. They did not come from the group of the 
privileged and the well-to-do. They were not part of the 
establishment, because they were not ethnic Russians. 
They did not belong to minority groups, although 
Alekperov is Azerbaijani. They couldn't be part of the 
military, the foreign service, the KGB, or the higher 
levels of government. They did not belong to the 
nomenklatura, which was entitled to special privileges 
and the exclusive stores that served the ministry of the 
gas and energy industry and the like. Some of them had 
been arrested for economic crimes, because in the 
Soviet era, if a person wanted to get ahead outside the 
established system, he had to go somewhere else, and 
many got involved in the black market. Some of them 
actually ended up in jail. When Mikhail Gorbachev 
said in 1987 that it was all right to form cooperatives 
and undertake private trade, some operatives surfaced 
from the underground. Their illegal activity became 
legal, and they had the advantage of knowing how to 
operate in an environment of scarcity. So they began to 
barter, import, buy and sell. Remember that 70 years of 
Communism had deprived people of goods, and the 
smart and the savvy, who knew how to acquire scarce 
merchandise for sale, began to earn large sums of 
money. They began to set up banks, which took as little 
as 75,000 dollars in capital. They used these banks as 
ATM outlets, and used the cash for participating in the 
privatization process.
Note that Gaidar and Chubais also set up the 
voucher system. They believed that every Russian was 
entitled to peoples' capitalism. The first step in the 
process involved turning over most of the assets to 
managers and workers to co-opt them so they would 
not strip the enterprises' assets. The stock that was left 
over could be exchanged for the vouchers so that 
everyone would have a share in the act. Some people 
thought that the vouchers could be sold for cash. You 
know most Russians were clueless about what a 
voucher was after 70 years of hearing that capitalism 
was bad, and paper assets were worthless. As a result, 
some enterprising individuals bought up these vouchers
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that gave them control over many of these factories. 
That was basically the privatization process.
Along comes Putin in 2000 who tries to rein them 
in. Yeltsin let them do what they wanted. Putin took 
charge and said: “I'm not going to treat the oligarchs 
any differently from how we would a baker or a shoe 
repairman.” But of course, there is a difference 
between running a bakery and an 8 billion dollar 
company. Putin does not like criticism, and forced the 
dissenters out. He also removed the minister of the gas 
industry and the chairman of the Russian central bank, 
two men who were wholly corrupt. You know it is 
significant that Russia's second largest producer of 
natural gas is in Florida. He brought in new oligarchs 
to take over some companies. I argue in my book that 
Russian business today continues along similar lines as 
in the tsarist days. The pattern of excessive reliance on 
raw materials persists. Again, if you want to operate 
under Putin, and if you cannot find a partner who 
supports Putin, you're in trouble.
I also examine the question: Where did these 
people learn capitalist tricks after 70 years of 
Communism? It turns out I have an uncle who ran a 
catering business, and he was eager to get the contract 
for the Moscow Olympics. He met with the head of the 
Olympics and was told at a meeting that he'd have to 
give a 20 percent kickback to a French-American 
expatriate who would launder that money to the French 
Communist Party and others in Europe. So the Soviets 
were already capable of carrying out underhand 
activity.
Again, how does one assess the role of Western 
advisers? I think the record was tainted. They operated 
in an environment of insider deals, even of crime and 
corruption that reached right to the top in Yeltsin's 
entourage. Let me tell you a story. A man drives into 
the Kremlin, and parks his car, and the guard says: 
“You can't park there, it's beneath Yeltsin's office.” 
The guy responds: “It's okay, I've locked the car.” 
That kind of law-breaking attitude extended to central 
bank officials who stashed away billions of dollars. I 
was watching the process. It was because of me they 
decided to put the money away into deep cover to hide 
it from the Paris and London Clubs, which negotiate 
Russia's sovereign and commercial debts from time to 
time. Privatization also affected us in this country. We 
prohibited entry of several oligarchs. But the question 
is: Was there an alternative? Yes, Poland. It wasn't 
perfect but the Polish privatizers realized that if the 
assets were to be divided equally, no one would be in 
charge. Instead, they set up a system of 15 mutual 
funds. Each company that was set up for privatization 
had 33 percent of its assets under the control of one of 
these mutual funds whose directors could fire managers 
and prevent them from stripping company assets. So let 
me conclude. Will Russia ever be able to escape its
past? The difference between the situation now and 15 
years ago is mind-boggling. Most assets are privatized 
but there are important structural defects. The role of 
the state has been diminished but not entirely. Some 
firms such as Gazprom are still controlled by the state, 
and the state can dictate the policy Putin wants. Russia 
still needs a patron at the top. The state still owns large 
chunks of stock in other companies.
From a historical perspective, the chinovnik, the 
bureaucrat, still endures. He was there under the tsars 
and under the Soviet Union, and he prevails now. Let 
me tell you another story. A man goes into a restaurant 
in Moscow and settles down, and hears another patron 
shout: “Turn off the air conditioner.” A little later he 
shouts again: “Turn on the air conditioner.” After 
several rounds of “turn it on” and “turn it off,” the 
quiet man calls over the waiter and asks: “Why do you 
put up with this?” The waiter says: “It's okay, we don't 
have an air conditioner.” So the bureaucracy endures in 
the midst of meaningless but restrictive practices.
One of the main structural problems is that small 
businesses constitute only 15 percent of Russian GDP. 
It is around 50 percent in the U.S. And they are the 
source of innovation and growth. Of course, a few 
foreign companies have done well in Russia. Gillette 
has made money. Many large foreign firms are 
expanding. But small firms are at a disadvantage. The 
upstream large units have a patron at the top protecting 
them, an advantage that the small businesses miss.
What are the prospects of the oligarchs making it 
out on their own? It's possible. Some are threatening to 
challenge Putin in the December Duma election. Let 
me end by saying that Russia is still a country where 
the rule of in-laws is still more important than the rule 
of law.
God is interviewing George W. Bush, French 
President Jacques Chirac and Vladimir Putin. Bush 
comes forward and says: “Tell me God, will the U.S. 
ever be able to get out of Afghanistan and Iraq? Will 
people ever believe that I won the Florida elections?” 
God goes to the books and says: “Yes, President, but it 
will be 25 years and you won't be around to see it.” 
And then he goes to Chirac, and Chirac asks if the U.S. 
will ever come to like France, and if France will bloom 
again as an economic power. God says: “Yes, it will in 
50 years, but you won't see it.” Finally Putin asks: 
“Tell me, God, will Russia free itself from dependence 
on raw materials, will the oligarchs ever become law- 
abiding citizens, will income be distributed equitably?” 
God goes to the books and says: “Yes, Mr. Putin, but I 
won't be around to see it.”
Desai: Marshall is a tough act to follow. He gave a 
comprehensive picture of Russian privatization naming 
the actors who participated in the process, and
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described its consequences. I will concentrate on three 
aspects.
First, I will distinguish between the short and the 
long term, emphasizing that the short-term goal of the 
process had the tactical purpose of keeping the reform 
momentum alive, whereas the long-term goal was the 
creation of an efficient private sector in Russia.
The process had a huge ideological, political thrust 
in the short run. It was in fact a demolition project. 
Marshall correctly described the scale as the largest in 
history. Despite its scale and complexity, I believe that 
its objective of creating a market-based private sector 
will be realized before God disappears, although it is 
still a good distance away.
My second point is that Russian privatization was 
not imposed from outside. Of course, the IMF and the 
World Bank supported it but they were essentially 
outsiders. It was conceived, implemented, and 
administered by Russian reformers led by Anatoly 
Chubais, whom Victor Chernomyrdin, prime minister 
from 1993 to 1998, described as a neo-Bolshevik. 
Imagine one of the world's leading reformers being 
called a neo-Bolshevik! Chernomyrdin implied that the 
scale, the speed and the secrecy of the process were 
monumental and therefore had Bolshevik features. In 
any case, the process was not imposed from outside.
Third, the voucher-based privatization, which 
began in October 1992 and ended in 1995, was 
followed by the loans-for-shares program in which the 
leading oligarchs gave cash to the Russian treasury in 
return for ultimately owning stock in Russian 
companies that the government put up as collateral. 
The government could not repay the loans so the 
oligarchs got the stakes in the companies. That was the 
much-maligned loans-for-shares scheme. So the two 
phases of the program had distinct features. These 
programs were two ways of achieving privatization in 
Russia.
Clearly there were negative consequences. Small 
businesses did not develop. The prize assets were 
captured by the oligarchs. There was corruption. I must 
say I have an open mind about corruption. Corruption 
is like adultery. It exists everywhere but it is difficult to 
define and measure. Sometimes I feel that experts and 
analysts of Russia focus excessively on Russian 
corruption. There is corruption in India and China. 
Both however continue growing at high rates. There 
was corruption in the East Asian economies that 
reached close to 10 percent annually before they were 
hit by the financial crisis that began in mid-1997. It is 
possible that profit-seeking corruption, in contrast to 
rent-seeking corruption, has a benign impact in 
promoting growth. But, of course, corruption needs to 
be reined in by law enforcement. And Russia lags 
behind in that respect.
Again, has efficient management developed in 
Russia's privatized industry? The oil companies are 
ahead in that respect in terms of management, 
technological improvement and financial cost-cutting. 
But the manufacturing sector has a long way to go and 
their corporate governance record is patchy.
But to return to the short-term objective of 
privatization. In July 1992, Acting Prime Minister 
Gaidar announced that macroeconomic stabilization 
was failing. The Central Bank of Russia was ordered 
by the Communist-dominated Supreme Soviet, the 
parliament, to print cash to bail out enterprises that 
came under varying pressure of the price decontrol of 
January. As inflationary pressures mounted, the reform 
momentum slackened. According to Gaidar, a “new 
front” had to be opened to keep it going. Notice the 
military terminology. That initiative came in the shape 
of voucher privatization. It was originally designed to 
be launched in March of 1993 but was brought forward 
to October 1992; 150 million vouchers of 10,000 rubles 
each were distributed to everyone. The Russians 
thought they were on their way to becoming instant 
capitalists. The purpose, as I said, was to keep the 
reforms going. The following April there was a 
countrywide referendum that posed two questions to 
the participants: "Are you for the president? Are you 
for his reforms?" Russians responded with a thumping 
“da” to both questions.
Everybody felt good about the prospects of 
profiting from the voucher without realizing the 
problems. The Bolshevik biscuit factory located in 
Moscow had good credentials but voucher holders in 
faraway Vladivostok could not put their vouchers in 
the factory because there were no brokers and no 
electronic connection. By the time the profitable 
Gazprom was opened up for vouchers toward the end 
of the program in 1995, most holders had used up their 
vouchers. Around that time, General Alexander Lebed, 
later the governor of Krasnoyarsk Province, was to 
declare that the voucher could not buy an iron for the 
holder. It was indeed a boondoggle. But as I 
emphasized its purpose was political.
The loans-for-shares program which began in 1995 
provided cash to the treasury so that it could fulfill IMF 
targets of budget deficit. It also financed the reelection 
of Boris Yeltsin as president in June 1996. With that in 
mind, the positive and negative aspects need to be 
carefully considered. First, as Marshall argued, the 
oligarchs had acquired the cash earlier, starting from 
Gorbachev's days, by acquiring oil and metals at 
controlled prices at home, exporting them at world 
prices and pocketing the difference. Their connections 
helped. They acquired the assets because they had the 
cash. So the process of the oligarchs capturing the 
crown jewels of Russian industry began earlier. Next, 
if not Yeltsin as the president, then who else? The
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alternative was the Communist leader, Gennady 
Zyuganov. Did we really want him to be the next 
president of Russia? With what consequences? So this 
was a tough choice. Again, the distinction between 
rent-seeking and profit-making asset acquisition, which 
I mentioned earlier, is relevant. I agree that the loans- 
for-shares program was not open and transparent. So 
the oligarchs grabbed the assets more or less as rent 
seekers. But they could emerge as profit makers in the 
oil industry, which was under external pressures of cost 
cutting and efficient management. Finally, how does 
one define Putin's role in this emerging scenario? He 
has been emphasizing growth and poverty reduction. I 
believe that the loans-for-shares program created huge 
social tensions. Most Russians felt cheated out of the 
asset distribution and were left with their potato 
patches. But given Putin's emergence as a strong, 
stabilizing leader, and a pliant Duma, resources can be 
collected from the oil oligarchs via proper tax policies 
in the interest of poverty reduction and development of 
small businesses, which Marshall talked about. So I 
look at the loans-for-shares program as having pluses 
and minuses.
I want to conclude with a comment on my final 
point of the prospects for higher efficiency in Russia's 
privatized industry. The recent BP-TNK oil deal may 
start the process of the entry of foreign direct 
investment in the Russian energy sector. The oil 
companies are making progress in terms of cost-
cutting, technological innovation and efficient 
management. Of course, the rest of Russian 
manufacturing has a long way to go. The strong ruble 
damages their competitiveness. From that perspective, 
a rapid entry of foreign direct investment into Russian 
manufacturing is a critical requirement for it to become 
competitive and resilient. Especially in the small 
businesses sector which Marshall talked about. Here 
the extensive, strangulating presence of local 
bureaucrats is relevant. But retiring them from the 
scene is a long, complex process. So my feeling is that 
Russian privatization was marked by tough choices 
involving pluses and minuses. We also need to 
distinguish between its short-term political focus and 
long-run economic challenges.
Millar: Professors Desai and Goldman have by now 
stolen most of my thunder. So I'll try to emphasize 
areas of disagreement. In my opinion, the best 
arguments that have been made for Russian 
privatization are political and not economic. But I'm 
not a political scientist and some of my poli-sci friends 
do not really agree with that particular standpoint. 
However, as an economist, I feel that the argument for 
haste is not compelling, and I think the long-term 
consequences—I mean now—ten years later have been 
disastrous from a welfare standpoint. And I'm not
prepared to let the Western advisors, the IMF, the 
World Bank, the EBRD, and the Western professors 
who went in to advise the Russians off the hook, 
because I think their influence was more insidious than 
Padma indicates.
The Russians, the young reformers in particular, 
were long engaged in studying Western, market- 
oriented economics. And the recommendations for 
haste and for voucher privatization really appeared in 
Western literature. Professor Richard Ericson here, for 
example, wrote an article that was published after the 
failed coup of August 1991. His was an attempt to see 
the Soviet system as a model in itself. He argued that it 
would be necessary to take the system apart very 
rapidly. That was one argument. Ed Hewett, who was a 
well-known economist, also gave several lectures on 
the same point. But I think they were trying to 
understand the system and suggest remedies. On the 
other hand, many of the advisors that came to Russia, 
were driven by questionable motives—at least one of 
them was—and I think that the Western conception of 
the process of the transition did have more influence 
than Padma thinks. And she'll get a chance to respond.
I think the market ideology was paramount in the 
process. If you look at some of the early articles about 
voucher privatization, the economists were talking 
about it as a process where everyone starts with an 
equal share of funds. But then along the way, those 
with the ability and ambition to rise to the top acquire a 
major chunk of the wealth. I think the Western advisors 
saw clearly in advance how it was going to work out. 
The fact that Russian citizens had experience with only 
two kinds of financial assets in their life, cash and 
saving accounts, was overlooked. Of course, there were 
government bonds but they were never redeemed and 
were considered a tax. The voucher holders really did 
not know what was likely to happen with the assets that 
were put up for privatization. As inflation increased 
rapidly, the vouchers actually became more valuable 
than anything that was paid for because they were not 
affected by prices. So a few took advantage of the 
possibility of enrichment and became, if not the 
oligarchs, essentially property owners. But this was not 
because they were savvy players but it was just good 
karma.
Yet another motive for hasty privatization was 
greed. They said that in the old Soviet system influence 
was higher than Stalin, and it continued to be higher 
than economic rationality. In the privatization process, 
personal connections, personal contacts were more 
important than cash. The second element was the 
holder's savvy in selecting and acquiring an asset. 
Third, even the Russian reformers had a poor 
understanding of the structure of the Soviet economy. 
The system had two markets. The market for consumer 
goods was an imperfect market. However, the fact that
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there were queues for goods that were under-priced 
was a sign that there was a market. The same held for 
the labor market. These were markets where people 
had experience of being paid wages, occasionally 
looking for jobs, and spending cash. So when markets 
were liberated, these two sectors began operating like 
regular markets.
By contrast, the Bolsheviks had destroyed the 
financial markets, the markets for investment goods 
and productive assets. These markets, which are 
essential to a capitalist system, simply did not exist in 
any form. There were no bankers who had ever 
evaluated projects on the basis of profitability. Nor 
were there managers with their pulse on profit making. 
This meant that liberalization and privatization were 
destined to become irrational. There was no basis for 
pricing assets that were to be privatized overnight. On 
the other hand, prices could not emerge until assets 
were privately owned and managed. A rational price 
system cannot emerge without private ownership. It 
was really a chicken and egg problem. So these 
concerns needed to be addressed in devising 
privatization programs. But they were ignored.
One special concern related to the ruble overhang 
with the population. An ideal way of clearing the 
accumulated rubles from the Soviet days was to 
allocate and sell apartments to people who lived there 
and owned them de facto. That scheme would have 
fulfilled Professor Montgomery's idea of everyone 
having some private property. Then again the problem 
of pricing the assets could have been handled by 
inviting Western firms for the job. That was an 
effective answer to the fear that otherwise they would 
revert to central planning under Communism. There 
are plenty of firms in the West that make it their 
business to evaluate enterprises. I see no reason why 
they wouldn't have been able to call them in to 
evaluate the airline company, or the automobile 
company in Russia, and come up with reasonable 
estimates of their true worth. Such assessment is often 
invited by private firms, and the truth is that would 
have been a correct, a rational way to go about Russian 
asset valuation. But the notion of evaluating businesses 
leading to an overall industrial plan, which was used by 
Japan and South Korea, was roundly criticized by 
Russia's Western advisors. An industrial plan coupled 
with the advice of Western companies to evaluate 
businesses would have been a better way of putting a 
price on those products.
In other words, I think that there were a lot of 
different arguments. If you separate them out, I'd say 
that the economic arguments suggest going slowly, 
more gradually, and in a more rational way. The 
political arguments suggest doing the transition in a 
different way. The problem about rushing it and doing 
it in haste is that it has been a long time without
success in Russia. The decline in GDP, GDP per 
capita, is much steeper than anyone anticipated, and 
much longer than we have witnessed anywhere else in 
the world. I think the process could have been managed 
better. And I treat it as not something to condemn 
people with but I think it is something to think about if 
we are faced with a similar situation somewhere else at 
another time.
So let me conclude by just raising a couple of other 
questions. What should be the principle of 
privatization? What is the economic basis for 
privatization? Well, I think we have to divide it into 
two categories. The first is the incentive effect. It is 
clear that people take better care of their own property 
than they do of public or someone else's property. It is 
clear that when we own everything, nobody owns 
anything. Anyone who visited the Soviet Union saw 
the disrespect for public property. You see the same 
thing in the U.S. The incentive effect applies to private 
housing and to small businesses. But I do not think it 
applies to the ownership of corporate shares, to giving 
people shares in enterprises. There is no incentive 
effect there. But we are talking about some other 
benefit from corporate shares. If you quizzed a 
Russian 12 years ago about the difference between an 
auto factory, owned by the state, and GM with 200 
million shares outstanding, he wouldn't have a clue. 
The fact is corporate enterprises with share ownership 
permit the exploitation of scale economies. That is their 
advantage. There is another form, the worker-owned 
enterprises. They have not done well. When they run 
into trouble, they face problems of downsizing. 
Workers cannot be fired. When they are successful, 
they are converted into joint stock enterprises without 
bringing new workers in to share the profits. So 
worker-owned enterprises have not lasted long.
So what are the advantages of a genuine 
shareholder-owned enterprise? One advantage is 
suggested by Marshall. It allows for the birth, growth 
and death of companies. That is more difficult under a 
government bureaucracy, despite sunset provisions 
allowing for their closure. By contrast, competitive 
pressures in a market economy allow firms to grow or 
downsize or disappear altogether from the market 
place. Next, private share ownership allows members 
of society to match risk and income profiles. In other 
words, individuals can decide how much risk they want 
to undertake in order to profit from it. So it provides 
an option to the public for diversifying its financial 
asset holding. Third, corporate shareholding also 
creates opportunities for enterprises to raise funds. 
Fourth, we in the U.S. have increasingly used a 
competitive system to eliminate monopolies, especially 
natural monopolies, and to extend the idea of 
competition and free entry that Marshall Goldman 
talked about. That is also where innovation takes place.
12
So to conclude, while private ownership and 
privatization generate these benefits, I do not see the 
need for rapid-fire privatization of large Russian 
enterprises. It was necessary to strengthen them and 
build them up. Look, if you want to sell your house, 
you in fact fix it to get a better market price. This has 
been done with successful privatization in which the 
better enterprises have been sold off first. By contrast, 
the peculiar privatization policy decisions in Russia 
resemble the New Economic Policy, the so-called NEP 
package under Lenin. Under NEP, small businesses 
and farms were retained under private ownership but 
the commanding heights of the economy, the large 
mining and manufacturing units, the railways were 
converted into public ownership. This policy change 
was calculated to give control of the economy to the 
Bolsheviks, enabling them to bring in socialism. 
Russian privatization, in my view, represents neo-NEP 
in which the state and the oligarchs hold the 
commanding heights, whereas small units have been 
allowed to coexist although they cannot expand. The 
process is incomplete but at this point I feel that a 
strange economy has been created in Russia, a neo- 
NEP arrangement in which the state and the few rich 
have gained control over the basic assets of the 
economy and everyone else gets the remnants.
Handelman: I'm tempted to say that the previous 
speakers were so brilliant that I really do not have 
anything much to add. I would summarize the various 
points of view about Russian privatization by saying 
that its various elements form a sort of a prism all the 
way from the most negative according to Jim to a more 
benign approach presented by Padma with Marshall 
somewhere in the middle. They all signal a sense of 
inevitability that it happened.
But is it really a success? If you went to Moscow 
today it presents a flourishing bastion of capitalism 
with the immense blossoming of stores, flashy cars 
including quite a few Mercedes Benz, and beautiful 
restaurants. You feel the Russians have made it and 
converted the country into a neo-capitalist or a neo- 
NEP system in ten years. Things seem to have worked 
out. Crime and corruption have faded. But if you went 
further beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg, you'd 
notice that little has changed. Here and there, the 
situation has even regressed in terms of some economic 
indicators. Maybe despite the problems, all we notice is 
success.
Having thought about the situation for quite a 
while, I am going to be a little provocative. It is 
possible that Russia could have avoided the loans-for- 
shares program with the oligarchs and still come out at 
much the same position. What has been left out here 
from the discussion is the link between privatization 
and the political and economic development. The
previous speakers have suggested that privatization 
was a political bargain. And that is very, very true. I 
would even go much further to say that, more than a 
bargain, it was a deal that was under way before the 
Soviet Union imploded. When I was doing research on 
the Russian mafia for my book, I ran into material in 
the archives related to the KGB. I saw memos and 
letters from KGB officers and sources in which they 
were basically planning the disposal of a lot of the 
assets. Some were to be put into new private banks. 
Others were destined to go abroad. Their basic 
assumption was: “The system as it operates now is 
probably not going to last. We do not know for how 
much longer, maybe five years, maybe ten years, but 
we want to position ourselves so we are ready to take 
advantage of whatever comes across, whatever happens 
over the next years.”
They probably did not expect things to fall apart so 
rapidly but they were certainly the best positioned and 
had the most capital to take advantage of the 
opportunities that came their way—all the bargain- 
basement companies and assets and resources of the 
old Soviet Union. And sure enough, several initial 
private companies and banks that were set up in the 
early 90s, had the KGB hand on it. In fact, many of the 
same people who at one point were talking against the 
evil capitalists ten years earlier were now in charge of 
making as much money as they could. Some of them 
were even hiring themselves as intelligence 
consultants. Why not? They were best poised to profit 
from the events around them. They had a sense of the 
direction of the economy, the changes that society was 
undergoing, and they wanted to be able to shape them.
The other major source of cash and capital in the 
early 90s, which enabled them to buy out as many 
resources and assets of the country as they could, was 
criminal capital. This originated in the black market, 
the gray market, whichever way you define it. That was 
basically the real economy of the country. And much 
of that money was essentially useless in the late 80s 
and early 90s, because the holders could not put it 
anywhere without running into major problems with 
the Party bosses and the security organs. When the 
system imploded, that money finally came into the 
open. It could be used, it could circulate. It could be 
invested in something different than jewelry, carpets or 
bribes, big and small, to other government officials, as 
was done, for instance, in Central Asia. So these huge 
streams of money converged in deals involving homes 
and apartments, one's own place to settle in.
At the same time, the new system was around the 
corner but not quite fully in. The reformers had a sense 
in the early 1990s that their project, the huge ambitious 
undertaking they were embarking on, creating 
capitalism after 70 years of Soviet-style socialism, 
might not work. And the biggest potential saboteurs
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were in the old Party. Indeed, the old nomenklatura that 
Marshall mentioned began to emerge and they had to 
be given a piece of the action if they were to be 
prevented from sabotaging the new arrangements. This 
wasn't just a theoretical issue. Several reformers I 
talked with in Moscow in the late 80s and the early 90s 
agreed that their teaming up with the old-timers was 
bad but they had no choice; they had to stack the odds 
with many of the criminal, anti-Communist 
organizations so that they would not create problems 
later on. But ultimately the chickens came home to 
roost. The problems of the late 90s arose from this deal 
with the devil.
Should they have done it? Did they have a choice? 
One of the direct results was that the reformers who 
made those deals with the devil became corrupt 
themselves. One by one they were accused in the press 
of bribes and high corruption. The shining example, in 
fact, someone still active on the Russian policy making 
scene, is Chubais who was one of the bright young 
reformers of the early 90s; he is now seen, right or 
wrong, as hopelessly corrupt. Remember, the 
experiment that Chubais and the rest began was 
intended to be political reforms but it became warped 
and corrupted in its economic consequences by this 
deal. But could they have made a different choice? And 
I would argue, yes, they could have. Because if we 
look at the net result, what we've got, despite the 
superficial glamour and prosperity in parts of Russia 
today, are huge pockets of resentment.
Now Padma raised the point that there is corruption 
everywhere, not just in Russia, but in most transition 
economies. Yes, people tell me that the corruption, the 
mafia, the rise of new organized crime, were 
temporary; that this happens all the time over a period 
of five, ten or fifteen years in transition societies; that 
today's robber-barons will become tomorrow's great 
industrialists; that they will win prizes for outstanding 
citizenship; that they will end up as chairmen of 
charities. It is true that some of them already are 
chairmen of charities. Many oligarchs, who rose to 
prominence in the early 90s, those who did not flee the 
country, are now seen as fine citizens. Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky is regarded as the most transparent 
billionaire anywhere in the world. Yes, it has worked 
for some of them. What has been left behind and not 
given sufficient prominence is the residual but 
significant feeling Russians have about this bargain. In 
public opinion polls from 1993, a majority of the 
people resents it. “If this is what democracy and 
capitalism amount to, we do not want them.” That is 
their verdict.
One recent bit of news about the infamous MMM 
venture, a pyramid scheme in the mid-1990s that 
attracted about 10 million people from Russia who lost 
about 100 million dollars. The perpetrators tried to get
away with it. They have finally been indicted in a 
Russian court. The final outcome is yet another story. 
But many people fell for the get-rich-quick ponzi 
scheme: “This is capitalism; everyone else is making 
money; let's get some ourselves.” There is a certain 
cynicism about it in the West: People occasionally get 
burnt in Wild West capitalism. It happens, but the 
overall result is a learning experience forever. The 
Russians are wary about the experiment, how it will 
finally end, and what it actually means to them. 
Marshall brings out a newsletter every month from the 
Davis Center. A recent issue had an interesting poll 
regarding corruption in which people were asked: “Can 
the government reduce corruption?” Thirty percent said 
“no” and only seven percent said “yes.” In other words 
massive skepticism still permeates the political and 
social scene.
In some ways, it has altered and distorted Russian 
politics today. Putin would not be president today if 
Russians did not resent the results of those early years 
of privatization and supposed capitalist successes. And 
remember, when he was campaigning, he promised that 
he would establish a dictatorship of laws. Nobody 
really knew what he meant then. We are starting to see 
a little bit of it now. He was going to tackle corruption, 
fight organized crime, make sure that wealth in Russia 
was redistributed throughout the country, something to 
counter the sense of aggrieved inequality that Russians 
felt from the early 90s. Has he done it? How successful 
has he been? This would take a whole afternoon of 
discussion in a separate conference. In many ways 
however, he has been successful. He has gotten rid of 
one group of oligarchs, he has slashed a lot of their 
clout in the economy. But he has, as everyone knows, 
his own oligarchs, although the power balance has 
turned around from what it was in Yeltsin's time when 
one could say the oligarchy ran Yeltsin; now it is Putin 
who runs much of the oligarchy. These people are still 
powerful in Russia, they still have significant political 
influence, but they've been tamed, so to speak, so that 
their influence is directed in the way the political 
system wants it to go.
The diagram that Marshall showed about the 
different oligarchs and what they control tells an 
interesting story. It's a shame that David Hoffman is 
not here because he thinks a new, kinder and gentler 
oligarchy has emerged in Russia. Seventeen Russians 
made the recent Forbes list of billionaires. Sure 
enough, a few in the list are young but most of them 
date back to the old days having connections with the 
old nomenklatura during the 1970s and 80s when they 
were picking up business opportunities. Besides, the 
system has not changed significantly from what it was 
in the early 90s. Therefore I go back to the question I 
raised at the start: Could privatization have been done 
differently? Should the privatization scheme, devoid
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of adequate laws or controls, have been undertaken at 
all? This question is important because we are still 
grappling with the problem of transforming economies 
that are politically stunted and largely state controlled. 
We face that problem in Iraq, how it can become a 
democratic, free enterprise economy. I suggest that 
Russia, even though the circumstances were different, 
offers a lesson for our policy makers. I firmly believe 
that we shouldn't go there again. And I'll stop here.
Millar: Thank you very much. Now we will give the 
speakers three minutes to respond.
Desai: I would like to respond first to Jim's point 
concerning external pressures. I believe that 
privatization was not imposed from outside although it 
was supported by outside technical and financial help. 
Privatization was essentially conceived and 
implemented by Chubais and his team. Next the entire 
reform process had several features of price decontrol, 
trade and capital account liberalization, and rapid-fire 
macroeconomic stabilization when inflation got out of 
hand in 1992. The IMF imposed budget deficit targets 
that could not be managed because of inadequate tax 
collection. Around 1996, foreigners were allowed to 
buy short-term Russian government T-bills, the GKOs. 
I have argued repeatedly that the financial opening up 
was a colossal mistake.
Not only were these measures for promoting hasty 
macroeconomic stabilization imposed from outside as 
IMF conditionality, they were actively promoted by the 
U.S. Treasury and facilitated by the broad policy-
making rapport that obtained between Boris Yeltsin 
and Bill Clinton. You should read Strobe Talbott's 
Russia Hand for the full story. I mean Clinton and 
Yeltsin were buddies, they bonded together, and at one 
point Clinton says, “Yeltsin drunk is to be preferred to 
any alternative sober.” So in effect, the transition 
became a joint demolition exercise. The two presidents 
worked together because they had common goals. 
Yeltsin was as bent on removing the Communist 
planned system as was Bill Clinton. That said, I would 
like to repeat that privatization as an important 
instrument of the reform strategy was planned and 
implemented by the Russian team. That's all.
Jim talked about the ruble overhang, the cash 
accumulated during the Soviet period because people 
had nowhere to spend their cash. They kept it at home 
under mattresses and in banks. In his view, the cash 
could have been liquidated by allowing the holders to 
buy apartments. Why wasn't that scheme adopted? 
Look, the Russian citizens owned the housing de facto, 
not de jure, having lived there for close to 40 or 50 
years. The alternative that Gaidar adopted was to raise 
prices; they freed most of them on January 2, 1992. As 
a result, a jar of sour cream, that cost 10 kopecks, cost
over a ruble after price liberalization. It wiped out 90 
kopecks from the buyer's pocket. But the overriding 
purpose was to obliterate the outdated regime of 
administered prices, to get the economy moving on a 
price-determined basis, and wipe out the long lines as 
well as the ruble overhang. On the other hand, if 
housing were privatized, the rest of the system would 
still have continued the way it was. What the shock 
therapists missed, and they were a bunch of 
technocrats, was denying selective relief to the poorest 
families via direct income subsidies or food stamps to 
counter the burden of higher prices.
Could any other feature of the transition have been 
managed slowly and systematically? Look, I have been 
known in the reform discussion as a gradualist. Could 
the post-1992 inflation haven been brought down 
systematically? The budget deficit criteria imposed by 
the IMF were unrealistic. The government was unable 
to raise taxes. Foreigners were allowed prematurely to 
step in buying the GKOs because they offered annual 
returns of 25 to 30 percent. Toward the end of 1997, 
inflation was brought down to an annual 5 percent level 
via stringent monetary policy. But, lo and behold, the 
Asian financial crisis hit Russia around that time and 
foreigners cashed their bills and walked out with the 
dollars.
Steve said that the privatizers made compromises 
with the devil. Perhaps. But the privatization process 
was legislated in the Duma; it was adopted by laws. 
When that did not work, presidential decrees pushed it 
forward. That was permitted by the Constitution of 
1993. Of course, Chubais made a pact with the 
Communists who dominated the Duma. The 
privatization option favored by factory insiders, 
workers and managers combined, gave them 51 percent 
of the shares. And that was a concession to the 
Communist nomenklatura, the managers, who did not 
want outsiders to grab factories. So there was give and 
take and compromises along the way.
Question from the audience: Can the panelists 
comment on the role of foreign investment in 
privatization?
Goldman: Remember the situation in the early 90s. 
The economy was collapsing. Managerial rules were 
opaque. Transparency was missing. Foreigners who 
stepped in were few and far. Boris Jordan, an 
American national of Russian parentage, opened the 
Moscow office of Credit Suisse First Boston. They 
bought up vouchers and got a share of foreign 
ownership. It was daring for foreign direct investors to 
step into Russia because the economy was collapsing. 
Its decline was 50 percent between 1990 and 1997. 
But there were exceptions. Mars and Gillette went in a 
big way. And I am talking about manufacturing, about
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foreigners buying or building a factory. Gillette 
continues to be profitable. Mars was successful until 
1998 at which point the factory was squeezed out by 
local bureaucrats.
Why was Kazakhstan attractive for foreign 
investors? Foreign investors are, of course, invading 
the Kazakh energy sector. The Russian oligarchs were 
not particularly eager to have foreign investors. BP is 
an exception. There is a possibility that Shell might 
buy a stake in an oil company. By and large, the 
oligarchs are not keen to have foreigners come in and 
mess up things. With regard to small businesses, stories 
abound about mafia, corruption, and collapsing units. It 
is important for a foreign investor to have a niche with 
a local guy. Just imagine you were Gillette, and you 
want to step in as an investor. How do you get into a 
country where the industry is state-controlled, and 
ministries are in charge of everything? The Soviet 
Union fell apart in 1991. There was a vacuum all 
around. How can a foreign investor create a 
distribution network? Perhaps he can do that as a 
vendor, but he can't do that as a manufacturer. And I 
saw how the Gillette people set up their network, and 
it's absolutely fascinating. They called it the Gillette 
miracle. They had to have a patron and be innovative 
through and through and that is not easy. Along came 
1998 and there was another collapse. Credit Suisse 
First Boston lost over a billion dollars. It was a costly 
lesson.
Desai: I think it was in July 2000 that former Treasury 
Secretary Paul O'Neill went to Moscow, and some of 
us were asked to give him suggestions for promoting 
American investment. He talked there about specific 
guarantees for foreign investors—tax guarantees, 
investment guarantees. Would they consider such 
proposals? The Russians threw cold water on the idea. 
I notice a strange coalition of bedfellows in Russia 
currently. The oligarchs do not want foreign direct 
investment except on their own terms and selectively. 
Their position is that they can give a boost to the 
economy on their own. They just need time. The 
Communists, the left, are weak now but they do not 
want foreign investment on the ideological ground that 
it is exploitative. The bureaucrats all over the country, 
and at the local level, oppose foreign investment flows. 
Controls help them. They can get bribes from this 
person and that person who wants to step into Russia. 
So this combination of oligarchs, bureaucrats, and the 
left is dead set against foreign investment flows which 
the Kremlin is not able to fight and tell them: "We need 
foreign direct investment in the manufacturing center 
without which Russia cannot grow at 7 to 10 percent 
annually."
In Russia, in several contexts, you hear ratios being 
cited. The maximum ratio of foreign investment stake
in Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas company, 
is 20 percent. That is good enough, the company says. 
In the old days, Indian planners used to debate about 49 
or 51 percent stake for foreign participation in Indian 
companies. Fifty-one percent for foreigners was a 
majority stake. In Russia, the preferred ratio is 20 or 25 
percent. They need a decisive, proactive push from 
policy makers in favor of foreign direct investment. 
That is what the Chinese leadership accomplished. 
That is missing in Russia.
Millar: I think I agree with Padma and Marshall. 
There is a general fear on the part of the public about 
foreign ownership of productive capacity and land. By 
the way, when the Japanese were buying up parts of the 
United States like Pebble Beach and the Rockefeller 
Center, even Americans got nervous. Some thought 
that they would detach these areas and send them back 
over to Japan! But the point is that there is still a 
concern, a fear about that in Russia. Remember in the 
early days, the situation was opaque, and foreigners 
were prepared to go as far as buying equity and short- 
and medium-term debt. This is how Russia got into so 
much trouble in 1998. What the Russians do not realize 
is that through joint ventures and production sharing, 
they can get technology, and new management. It is not 
just a question of foreign investment flows. Russia 
today exports more capital than is ever likely to come 
in via foreign investment flows.
Question from the audience: How can Russia develop 
its oil resources in a major way?
Goldman: American investors wanted guarantees of 
production sharing agreements, the so-called PSAs, for 
stepping into the Russian oil sector. It is an investment 
procedure that resembles their involvement in the 
Middle East. They develop the oil fields, they lift oil 
production, and they want to share the profits. But they 
want to recoup their profits via guaranteed output. 
They didn't want to be there as hired hands. The 
potential could be unlimited. But this arrangement 
implied that you took the equity away from local 
owners. And naturally the Duma resisted these 
proposals for several years. The Sakhalin I project is 
the only one which guarantees risk for foreign 
investors. But these oil fields are located offshore in 
the far North-East. It is freezing cold out there. They 
can operate only a few months in the year. There were 
prolonged discussions about having PSAs elsewhere. 
Two weeks ago they announced that PSAs are off the 
table. They might even revoke some past agreements. 
BP wanted to operate more fields via PSA-type 
arrangement but it may have to step back. That is a 
clever way of discouraging BP. The Russians say: "We 
can hire Halliburton, we do not want to make huge
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profits. Let us hire Western service companies. They 
can do the job and then go home."
We just had a conference this weekend where we 
discussed the question of exploring Russian oil 
resources. An interesting development is that several 
oil companies, among them Tyumen Oil, Yukos, and 
Lukoil, have brought in outside directors. A former 
senior officer of Chevron, who was also a director on 
the Chevron board, who was active in developing 
Kazakh oil fields, is now on the board of Lukoil. He is 
doing his level best to open it to the West. Yukos has 
two Americans on its board of directors, one of whom 
is Sarah Carey, a Washington lawyer. How effective 
will they be? They're pretty tough characters. Another 
speaker at the conference, Allan Bingham, a Harvard 
Business School graduate, went to work for Tyumen 
Oil. He basically handles the outside investment of the 
company. In other words, more Western investors and 
managers have stepped into oil companies. But I have 
doubts if more will follow suit, especially with Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos. He has been 
involved in a number of scams before he declared that 
he's been born again, or born for the first time, to see 
just how it works out. He has even set up an Open 
Society Fund in Russia. He is doing a variety of things. 
Some oligarchs are sending their children here. I had a 
few as my students at Wellesley. They launder their 
children, bring them home, nice and clean, and 
everything is fine.
A voice from the audience: What does a laundered kid 
look like?
Handelman: Just to take off on what Marshall was 
saying. This is a critical time for Russia, and their 
biggest macroeconomic challenge currently is 
integrating into the world economy. Russia is on its 
way to becoming a full-fledged member of G-8, or will 
be in France in May on the assumption that the meeting 
will happen. It is pushing for membership in the WTO. 
If a lot of building blocks come together then, yes, 
definitely, Russia can move effectively into the 21st 
century. However, one has to be a bit skeptical 
because, as in any country, there are protectionist 
sentiments, and they are particularly high in Russia. 
These are driven by the impact and resentment of the 
last ten years that we've been talking about this 
evening. The country has powerful oligarchs who are 
not in favor of seamless integration; there are others 
who are but they want to protect their industries. How 
effective Putin can be in managing this debate will be 
one of his key foreign challenges over the next year or 
two.
Question from the audience: Which way will the 
debate go?
Handelman: Well, predictions are terrible. It's quite 
possible that Putin can manage it if he comes through 
on his promise to establish a dictatorship of the law, 
creating a legal framework for moving Russia one step 
ahead. It's not a question of how much time it takes to 
prove if privatization works or doesn't work. It is 
obviously a long complicated process. The argument is 
that privatization isn't necessarily the same as 
providing Russians with the essential sense of control 
of their economy. If we look at our households on an 
individual basis, they manage to make enough money 
in order to survive. Likewise if Russians can be 
convinced of the burgeoning ownership of property, 
that they can hand it over to their children, and of the 
stable society that was implicitly promised to them in 
the 1991 revolution, then I think the process will take 
off. If they are not convinced of that—and there's 
every reason to believe that's likely because of the 
crime and the corruption—I think that the experiment 
will stop in its tracks, and we'll see some features of 
the old Russia that we saw before Communism and that 
we saw during the Communist period.
Desai: I think that Putin in his second term—and his 
chances of being reelected in April 2004 are substantial 
and that will perhaps be his second and last term—I 
think he could be a more audacious reformer in his 
second term. I'm hoping that he will be. After all, he is 
from St. Petersburg, and he may choose to follow his 
great predecessor, Peter the Great, who opened a 
window to the West. So the chances of his opening up 
Russia to the West are not bad at all. In an interview 
with me, Strobe Talbot used the term zapadnichestvo, 
which he translated as Russia's “Western vocation.” He 
said that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin used it but 
Putin does display his Western orientation. However, 
how assertive he can be vis-a-vis the oligarchs, the 
bureaucrats and part of the military is open to question. 
Perhaps, in his second term he can be more effective 
than he has been in the past three years.
Goldman: Can I dissent from that? In many ways, he's
an improvement over Yeltsin, in terms of stability 
certainly. We never knew where Yeltsin was 
physically, or mentally. We know Putin as a very 
strong leader. I get the feeling, however, that he
doesn't understand what a market is. Of course, he
espouses it, and he has good advisors who have 
advised him to lower and simplify taxes, and to reduce 
the amount of regulation. But if you cross him, you're
gone. I mentioned Boris Jordan before, an American of 
Russian heritage, who went back and launched the 
Moscow office of Credit Suisse First Boston. He 
thought that he had an understanding to run a media 
outlet which was a little more critical than Putin would 
have wanted, and basically Jordan disappeared. He was
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pushed out. You need this patron, and that's a little 
scary. What will happen in the December 
parliamentary election? The discussions I had in 
Moscow suggested that Putin might go after some of 
the oligarchs. So the oligarchs are doing all they can to 
move into some of the other parties including the 
Communist Party to make sure that a core in the Duma 
can prevent Putin from becoming too authoritarian.
Question from the audience: Can the panelists give us 
an idea of the role of the oligarchs in the future 
development of the oil industry?
Goldman: The Russian economy is being flooded by 
oil export earnings. The oligarchs realize that having 
grabbed almost all the oil wealth, the next step is to 
enhance their net worth by attracting Western 
investors, by becoming more transparent, by hiring 
Western accounting firms, and sending people out for 
training. A large number of Russians trained in the 
Harvard and Columbia business schools have gone 
back. Look, Simon Kukes, the head of Tyumen Oil, 
worked for Amoco for a long time, and returned to 
work for the oil company. Joseph Bacaleinik, who 
worked for the Vladimir tractor factory, came over to 
the U.S. on a partial scholarship to Harvard, and 
returned as number two man at Tyumen Oil. The 
company had a fight with BP, and BP threatened to sue 
them. But they worked out their differences, and BP is 
putting close to $7 billion in the unit. But there are 
questions for the next phase. Will the oligarchs 
improve management in, say, agriculture? In some of 
the provinces, the local oligarchs and government 
bureaucrats are in cahoots with one another. Gradually 
capital will flow in there too, raising opportunities for 
making money. It remains to be seen whether that will 
happen honestly or otherwise, and how long that will 
take place. But clearly improvements are on the way. 
Whether Putin will slap down people who criticize him 
is for me really the big issue.
Desai: I have another scenario in mind. The economy 
right now is oil driven. Suppose the price of oil drops 
to 15 dollars a barrel from its current level of 28-30 
dollars, then what? Will the oil and metals oligarchs 
then move into other activities such as processed food 
or sophisticated manufacturing? In that case, they will 
need foreign investment flows to bring in appropriate 
management practices and technology. So the potential 
for diversification rests on the price of oil.
Millar: Let me make a quick point. We keep talking 
about oil, and oil is a special case. The Western oil 
companies are used to taking very large risks because 
there is a huge reward. When you get into areas of 
manufacturing, you get value-added. But that's an area
in which it is particularly difficult to attract foreign and 
domestic investment. I think it's really up in the air 
whether or not diversification will happen.
Question from the audience: Can Russia develop a 
domestic Silicon Valley?
Handelman: Let me answer the Silicon Valley 
question. Russia has talented people with a huge 
potential resource of skills and human capital. Russia 
also has raw materials. So it should, by right, become a 
first world economy. Countries, among them Canada, 
are making a slow transition to a first world economy 
because they lack raw materials, although not 
excessively. That is not Russia's problem. Russia does 
not have that problem. As for Russia's Silicon Valley, it 
is largely in New York and California and Boston. I 
mean there are brilliant programmers who are here 
rather than there. The reasons are many, not just salary. 
They have comforts here they would miss in Russia.
Questions from the audience: Australia with 
enormous natural resources has prospered. Can Russia 
advance similarly? What are the prospects for the 
Russian telecommunications industry?
Goldman: Let me try to answer these questions. 
Australia has prospered because it has served as a 
provider of raw materials for China. Could Russia 
serve similarly for other countries? Of course, it has 
and it is. But Russians want to step into manufacturing. 
The trouble is that it has got so much in the way of raw 
materials. We did not really talk about that. Every time 
a massive influx of dollar earnings from petroleum 
pushes up the value of the ruble, imports become 
cheaper making it harder for local manufacturers to 
compete. So when the oil industry prospers, the more 
difficult it's going to be to hold the ruble down to give 
local manufacturers a chance.
What about high-tech and telecommunications? 
Well, there is a telecommunications industry in Russia. 
It is kind of made to order. The Soviet-era 
telecommunications industry was backward. There 
were inadequate land lines. Thus, mobile phones 
became an attractive alternative. However, Putin came 
along and yanked the franchise licenses away from 
some of the firms that had set up mobile phone 
networks and turned them over to some of his buddies 
in St. Petersburg. The challenge now for Russian 
manufacturers is that they must compete now with 
India and China. The Russians clearly have that talent 
but a lot of them have left. In terms of manufacturing, 
value-added is a difficult thing. It's not just that a 
relatively stable political climate is necessary. I'd also 
say that corruption is a deterrent. However, a long time 
horizon is a must. The payback from raw materials is
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pretty fast. By contrast, manufacturing ties down an 
investor for ten years or more. That means an 
environment with unstable and uncertain money-
making opportunities can be disruptive for the 
development of manufacturing. There are other 
opportunities in other places around the globe. So 
that's what I think holds Russia back. I just wrote a 
paper in a journal arguing that manufacturing in a 
balanced economy is a very long way off in Russia.
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